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Zurich. Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland.
‡Department of Economics, University of Cologne. Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany.
§Department of Economics, University of Zurich. Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland.
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1 Introduction
When different people exert different levels of effort, an egalitarian distribution of jointly-
generated proceeds is not necessarily “fair.” In this sense, egalitarianism might not
always be socially desirable. If agents anticipate the results of their effort, social con-
ventions dictating egalitarian allocations can greatly diminish incentives to exert effort
to achieve a high performance.
This simple observation points to a conflict arising from different human motiva-
tions. On the one hand, most human beings strive to perform well. Indeed, psycho-
logical research has identified achievement motivation as a basic (intrinsic) motive (e.g.,
McClelland et al., 1989; Brunstein and Heckhausen, 2008). This goes hand-in-glove with
the view that individual effort should be rewarded. On the other hand, research in be-
havioral economics has identified inequality aversion, which implies a preference in favor
of egalitarian outcomes even if they result in a reduction of the own payoffs, as an im-
portant factor in decisions concerning (re)distribution (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). When confronted with the decision
to allocate the proceeds from individual effort, these two motivations result in opposite
tendencies, which are at the heart of discussions on many socioeconomic issues, ranging
from performance pay within firms to redistribution of income through tax systems.
In this work, we contribute to the investigation into the motivations underlying pref-
erences among distributional allocations. We aim to show that preferences for egalitarian
redistribution, as opposed to rewarding individual performance, hang in a fragile balance
and can be significantly reduced with subtle interventions. In particular, we focus on
a manipulation derived from performance curiosity, defined as the desire to know the
own performance (especially in relative terms). The rationale is that the motivation
to achieve and perform well is linked to self-reputation and self-image concerns, which
are themselves closely linked to the notion of identity (Mazar et al., 2008; Bénabou and
Tirole, 2011). Obviously, information on the own performance has a crucial impact on
the self-image. We hence postulate that human beings might be willing to give up the
benefits of their own effort to appease their inequality aversion, but this willingness only
lasts as long as they at least receive the information on how well they have performed.
Specifically, if social conventions, on top of imposing an egalitarian redistribution, go to
the extreme of eliminating (relative) performance feedback, we postulate that preferences
for egalitarian distributions will be greatly reduced.
In this paper, we report on two experiments with an innovative design which pits
inequality aversion against curiosity regarding the own performance in a real-effort task.
The task is used to generate surplus, and is followed by a distributional allocation deci-
sion within a group. The design creates a tradeoff between an egalitarian allocation and
receiving information on performance in the real-effort task. We show that this subtle
manipulation can shift preferences away from egalitarian allocations.
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In our first experiment (N = 180) participants generated income by working on a
real-effort task and subsequently decided on the allocation of the joint proceedings within
a small group. In the control treatment, participants chose between an egalitarian allo-
cation and a performance-based one, leading to the standard observation of inequality
aversion. In the experimental (“No Info”) treatment, the only change was that opting
for the egalitarian distribution came at the cost of not knowing the actual performance
and ranking in the real-effort task. The design highlights relative performance, because
the information, if revealed, includes the performance and rank of all group members,
enabling social comparisons. This change had a large effect, with participants choos-
ing the performance-based distribution rather than the egalitarian one. In the second
experiment (N = 270) we replicated the results of the first experiment and also added
a third treatment and additional questionnaires to test for further explanations of the
basic effect.
Our tasks were explicitly incentivized. Hence, given the own expected performance,
participants could easily compute which of the two allocations would maximize their
(expected) monetary rewards. The allocations were designed in such a way that only
those expecting to be strictly above average would be better off under the performance-
based allocation, with all others being better off under the egalitarian allocation. Hence,
we elicited expected performance in the real-effort task and controlled for it by testing the
basic hypotheses also within different groups (in terms of expectations) and by including
the corresponding variable as a control in our regressions. As was to be expected, a higher
expectation led to a higher percentage of performance-based choices, but the basic effect
remains clearly significant.
In view of evidence on gender differences and competition (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003;
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), we were also interested in gender effects. For this rea-
son, we were led to a design with perfectly balanced participation across gender and a
sample size large enough to examine gender differences. Specific hypotheses regarding
those can also be derived from research on inequality aversion. Some studies in this
field have found gender differences, as reflected, e.g., in the proportion of egalitarian
allocations in Dictator and Ultimatum games (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 2006). However, the
evidence is mixed. Croson and Gneezy (2009) argue that there is no difference in social
preferences, and that the observed effects arise due to gender differences in the sensi-
tivity to cues in experimental contexts. The latter hypothesis is motivated by research
in psychology establishing that women are more sensitive to social cues and feedback
than men (Gilligan, 1982; Roberts and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989). Since our manipulation
involves the provision of feedback, it is natural to expect that the basic effect should be
especially pronounced for women, compared to men. Indeed, the treatment effect in our
experiments was clearly stronger among women, with behavior in the control treatment
exhibiting clear gender differences which vanished in the No Info treatment. Controlling
for expected performance allows to uncover the roots of this gender effect: women had
a lower expected performance than men, leading to a lower percentage of performance-
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based choices in the control treatment (due to extrinsic, monetary rewards) which was
overcome in the experimental treatment.
We conclude that performance curiosity, i.e. wanting to know one’s own (relative) per-
formance, can counteract inequality aversion as a motivation and tilt decisions away from
egalitarian distributions and toward performance-based ones. Additionally, creating a
tradeoff between information and egalitarian allocations substantially reduces gender dif-
ferences in behavior, with women becoming more willing to accept performance-based
allocations. This is a potentially important insight for incentive design and the reduction
of gender differences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some related literature strands
and helps place our experiments in a broader context. Section 3 describes the design of
Experiment 1 and presents the analysis of the data. Section 4 does the same for Ex-
periment 2. Section 5 discusses the results. Appendix A analyzes some closely related
constructs which were measured through questionnaires in our experiments and dis-
cards them as possible alternative explanations. Appendix B contains the experimental
instructions.
2 Related Literature
Our results are in agreement with the literature showing that preferences for egalitarian
allocations, or, more generally, reducing inequality, seem not to be stable. For instance,
dictator-game giving is reduced if the perception of anonymity and social distance is
increased (Hoffman et al., 1994; Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Franzen and Pointner,
2012). Also, subtle content-free psychological manipulations cause radical shifts of be-
havior (Achtziger et al., 2015, 2016, 2018). Further, part of the motivation for reducing
inequality might be related to the desire to show others that one is not selfish (Bardsley,
2008; Cappelen et al., 2013). Further, unequal payoffs are often deemed acceptable, pro-
vided some justification is given, e.g. merit, entitlement, or needs (Forsythe et al., 1994;
Hoffman et al., 1994; Konow, 2003; Fershtman et al., 2012). This already points out that
the balance between rewarding performance and distributing resources equitably can be
shifted if the link to performance is emphasized (e.g., through merit or entitlement).
The studies reported here are also related to the extensive social-psychological litera-
ture on social comparisons, which goes back to Festinger (1954). This literature stresses
the human desire to evaluate oneself. The very first hypothesis is that people have a
basic need to evaluate themselves and their performance. The second hypothesis is that
social comparisons are used to fulfill this desire since objective evaluations are often
unavailable or difficult to obtain (see also Moore and Klein, 2008). For instance, Trope
(1980) asked experimental participants to rate computer games requiring eye-hand coor-
dination, but which differed in how accurately skill was linked to outcomes. Participants
preferred games with accurate feedback, bearing the potential negative consequences for
their self-esteem, over games which were not diagnostic for the participant’s skill.
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Recent studies in economics have also clearly shown that information on the own
(relative) performance has a strong impact on motivation. Several studies have shown
that the provision of feedback has a positive effect on performance in the laboratory
and in the field (Hannan et al., 2008; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010; Blanes i Vidal and
Nossol, 2011; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012). Azmat and Iriberri (2016) have recently shown
that information on relative performance increases effort and affects satisfaction when
payoff depends on performance (piece-rate wage), but has no effect in either when pay is
independent of performance (flat rate). Schoenberg and Haruvy (2012) gave participants
in an experimental asset market information on either the highest- or lowest-earning
trader in the market, period by period. Market prices were significantly higher when
the information of the highest-performing trader was presented, and the satisfaction of
the traders was higher if they had a good relative position relative to the presented
information.
In agreement with developments in research on social comparisons as quoted above,
research in economics has also argued that people may care about relative performance,
as captured by rankings, even when rankings have no financial consequences, because of
its impact on self-image (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011; Köszegi, 2006).1 For instance,
Berger et al. (2013) show that ratings on performance are more effective for increasing
productivity if there is a high level of differentiation in the feedback.2 However, this
strand of the literature has typically concentrated on the link between information on
performance and performance itself, while our aim is to establish the link between in-
formation on performance and preferences on distributional allocations.
Of course, the concept of curiosity (in a general sense) has received a great deal of
attention in psychology. An influential curiosity-related construct is lay epistemic the-
ory (Kruglanski, 1989), which describes the factors involved in the general knowledge
formation process. It describes four epistemic motivations related to the need for spe-
cific or nonspecific closure, and the need to avoid them. Those determine the length
of hypothesis generation and testing sequence to evaluate evidence and form a belief.
Although similarities between social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954) and lay epis-
temic theory seem apparent, the latter does not suggest a general drive towards social
comparison and weighs informational sources by their relevance, not by their similarity
towards oneself.
1Work in evolutionary game theory has shown that relative-payoff concerns, which go hand-in-glove
with imitating behavior, can tilt long-run predictions away from Nash equilibria (Vega-Redondo, 1997;
Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005) and towards more competitive ones in experimental markets. This prediction
has been confirmed in several Cournot-oligopoly experiments, e.g. Huck et al. (1999) and Offerman et al.
(2002). In alignment with those, Fatas et al. (2015) found that the availability of a relative-performance
measure led to more competitive outcomes.
2Payment schemes based on relative performance can sometimes decrease productivity. In a field
experiment, Bandiera et al. (2005) found that productivity under piece rates was substantially higher
than under relative incentives, because workers took into account the negative externality their effort
imposed on others. However, an altruistic motivation was ruled out because this effect was only present
when monitoring was possible.
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Another important construct is epistemic curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994; Litman et al.,
2005), defined as “the desire for knowledge that motivates individuals to learn new
ideas, eliminate information-gaps, and solve intellectual problems” (Litman, 2008, p.
1586). Epistemic curiosity is subdivided in two broad categories. The first is interest-
type curiosity, which involves the anticipated pleasure of new discoveries. The second is
deprivation-type curiosity, which is the need to reduce uncertainty and eliminate unde-
sirable knowledge gaps. To check for the possible relation between these concepts and
performance curiosity, we included the epistemic curiosity questionnaire by Litman and
Mussel (2013) in Experiment 2 (see Appendix A).
Our explanation for the relevance of performance curiosity hinges on the value of
feedback for the own self-image. Psychological research (Sedikides and Strube, 1995,
1997) has identified four cardinal self-motives as relevant to the development, mainte-
nance, and modification of self-views . These are self-enhancement (the desire to see
oneself positively), self-verification (the desire to confirm a preexisting view of oneself),
self-assessment (the desire to know the truth about oneself), and self-improvement (the
desire to improve oneself). To check the possible relation between these concepts and
performance curiosity, we included the questionnaire by Gregg et al. (2011) in Experi-
ment 2.
A study by Van de Ven et al. (2005) investigated how curiosity regarding an uncertain
outcome contributes to the endowment effect, which causes a disparity between selling
and buying prices. In an experiment involving lotteries, sellers were more curious about
the outcome than buyers and the curiosity positively correlated with the minimum selling
price. A second experiment involved tokens initially held by sellers whose actual value
(exchange rate) was uncertain. Post-trade information about that value differed across
conditions. Minimum selling prices were significantly higher for sellers who would not
learn about the exchange rate of a token they sold, compared to sellers who would learn
about the exchange rate independently of whether they sold it or not. This showed a
willingness to pay for the satisfaction of curiosity, which added to the endowment effect.
Last, our experiments are related to the literature on gender effects in competition.
In our case, the decision on how to redistribute the joint earnings of the group came
after performing the task. Therefore, we do not deal with performance differences or
with preferences for competition, but rather with preferential choices in distributions.
Still, our work is obviously related to those strands of the literature at a conceptual
level. There are well-established gender differences in the attitudes toward competition.
Gneezy et al. (2003) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) showed that women tend to
shy away from competition in real-effort tasks, and Gneezy et al. (2009) showed that
matrilineal and patriarchal societies differ with regard to competitive behavior.3 A recent
3Our design bears procedural similarities to Task 4 in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) in the sense that
participants perform the task without knowing the incentive rule and choose the compensation scheme
later. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) offered a choice between piece-rates or competitive tournaments,
while our design involves neither, but rather different distributions of the joint income generated by the
group.
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field experiment by Azmat et al. (2016) has shown that women perform worse than men
when stakes are high, while the opposite is true when the stakes are low.
3 Experiment 1
3.1 Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research and
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).4 Participants were recruited from the Uni-
versity of Cologne’s pool, excluding psychology students, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
The experiment was a between-subject design with 180 participants, 45 females and 45
males in each of the two treatments. Average payoff was EUR 13.25 (USD 17.80) for a
session that lasted around 60 minutes. Subjects were assigned to groups of five players,
but they did not know the identities of the other group members.5 Further, both the
task and the subsequent allocation decision were made individually and there was no
interaction of any kind except in the determination of payoffs at the end of the experi-
ment. Initially, subjects worked individually in a real-effort task requiring to add up sets
of five two-digit numbers (e.g. 30+87+19+16+38=) for a predetermined time. Each
correct answer generated 10 points, with an exchange rate of 5 Euro cents per point,
but no feedback on the correctness of the responses was provided until the end of the
experiment. Subjects were not allowed to use calculators or other electronic devices, but
they were allowed to use scratch paper. This real-effort task was proposed in Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) and has been often used in experiments (e.g., Azmat and Iriberri,
2016).6
The real-effort task lasted for eight minutes, which is relatively long. This duration
was selected to put enough weight on the effort side rather than on the skills of the
subjects. Also, a shorter task duration would have increased the probability of ties inside
each group. After performing the task, the experiment moved to the decision-making
part without any feedback being provided.
Participants were asked to make a decision on how they would prefer to distribute the
joint amount of points generated by the group. They were informed that one of the group
members would be selected at random and his or her decision would be implemented as
stated.7 Two distributions were available. The first was an equal split, where all group
4The data and the codebooks for both experiments can be downloaded from http://osf.io/5hkj6.
5In particular, they had no information on the gender composition of their group. This is particularly
important, because gender composition might affect decision making and performance within a group
(Gneezy et al., 2003; Apestegúıa et al., 2012).
6Women often think that their performance in math will be worse than that of men, which sometimes
leads to actually worse performance due to “stereotype threat” (Spencer et al., 1999; Gneezy et al., 2003).
However, a meta-analysis of 100 studies on gender differences in math performance showed that there is
no gender difference in arithmetic or algebraic performance (Hyde et al., 1990).
7Subjects were informed that they were part of a group at the beginning of the experiment, and they
were aware that after finishing the real-effort task, they would decide among two distribution rules for
sharing the joint surplus, with one decision implemented at random. However, they were not informed
about the specifics of the possible distribution rules until the decision had to be made.
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Table 1: Treatment Overview: Distribution and Information Revelation
Control Treatment No Info Treatment
Equal Split Performance-Based Equal Split Performance-Based
Rank Share (%) Rank Share (%) Rank Share (%) Rank Share (%)
1 20 1 40 - 20 1 40
2 20 2 30 - 20 2 30
3 20 3 15 - 20 3 15
4 20 4 10 - 20 4 10
5 20 5 5 - 20 5 5
members earned the same amount of points. The second was a performance-based split,
leading to a different amount of points depending on the relative rank within the group
(see Table 1). Specifically, the performance-based split made the three worst-placed
participants earn less than under the equal split, in order to create a clear tradeoff
between monetary rewards and feedback provision for the median participant.8
The key manipulation between treatments was the amount of information that was
revealed with each possible distribution. In the Control Treatment participants chose
one of the two distributions, but later the ranking and the number of correctly solved
calculations was revealed independently of which distribution was finally implemented.
However, in the No Info Treatment participants were told that the ranking and the
number of correctly solved calculations would only be revealed if the performance-based
split was actually the one chosen and implemented. The alternatives are detailed in
Table 1.
In the absence of self-image concerns, the difference across treatments should not
affect behavior. In the presence of performance curiosity, however, we should observe
a higher proportion of performance-based choices in the No Info treatment than in the
control treatment.
To control for various other possible explanations for differences in behavior across
treatments we also elicited self-efficacy before and after the real-effort task. That is,
participants were asked how many additions they thought they could solve correctly in
eight minutes. Further, they were asked to report their expected relative performance
in a 7 seven-point scale ranging from “Far below average” to “Far above average.” To
control for individual differences in the regression analysis in attitudes and motivation,
we also elicited risk aversion attitudes using the lottery questionnaire of Holt and Laury
(2002) and the reduced Achievement Motive Scale of Lang and Fries (2006), using the
German version of Dahme et al. (1993) (the analysis of those is relegated to Appendix
8The performance-based distribution allocates 15%, 10%, and 5% of the joint proceeds to the 3rd,
4th, and 5th group member, respectively. Hence choosing the performance-based distribution entails a
clear monetary cost for participants who expect to be average or worse. The participants ranked first
and second are rewarded with 40% and 30% of the joint proceeds, that is, by a factor of 2 and 1.5,
respectively, compared to the equal-split distribution. This makes clear that the distribution indeed
rewards performance.
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A). At the end of the experiment participants received feedback (if any) on a screen
where their rank and the number of correctly solved additions were highlighted.
3.2 Distribution choices
The percentage of performance-based choices in both distributions is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1(a). In the control treatment, there is no tradeoff since the same information is
revealed independently of which distribution is implemented. Hence, this treatment is
a pure test of inequality aversion. In agreement with standard results in the social
preferences literature, only 35 of the 90 participants (38.89%) in this treatment chose
the performance-based distribution. In contrast, this proportion rose to 70.00% in the
No Info treatment (63 out of 90). The difference is highly significant according to a
test of proportions (z = −4.191, p < 0.0001).9 Thus, subjects chose the performance-
based distribution in the No Info treatment more often than in the control treatment.
Since the only difference between treatments is the information that is revealed when
the equal split is implemented, the difference in results is due to the tradeoff regarding
information on performance. We hence conclude that performance curiosity overcomes
inequality aversion in our data.
Since we expected a gender effect, we analyzed the behavior of the women and men
separately. Figure 1(b) shows the proportions of participants choosing the performance-
based split across treatments by gender. The overall effect observed in Figure 1(a) seems
to be driven by female behavior. While only 10 women out of 45 (22.22%) chose the
performance-based split in the control treatment, the proportion rose to 68.89% (31 out
of 45) in the No Info treatment (test of proportions, z = −4.445, p < 0.0001). The
difference goes in the same direction for men, with 55.56% of performance-based choices
in the control treatment vs. 71.11% in the No Info treatment, but the difference misses
significance (z = −1.531, p = 0.1257). As a result, while females chose the equal split
more often than males in control treatment (test of proportions, z = 3.2434, p = 0.0012),
the difference disappeared in the No Info treatment (z = 0.2300, p = 0.8181). We delay
the analysis of the interaction between treatment and gender to the regression analysis
below (Table 2, Model 2; Section 3.4).
That is, while men choose the performance-based distribution more often, as soon as
a tradeoff involving performance curiosity is introduced, women behave exactly as men.
3.3 Expected Performance
There is one obvious, rational reason for some participants to choose the performance-
based split. If the participant believes that he or she is likely to be strictly above the
group’s average, the individual payoff under the performance-based split is higher than
under the egalitarian allocation. Reciprocally, if the participant believes to be at or
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Figure 1: Experiment 1, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits. (a) Proportion of
participants choosing the performance-based split across treatments. (b) Proportion
of participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment and gender. ***
p < 0.01, test of proportions
below average, the individual payoff is higher under the egalitarian allocation (recall
Table 1). Hence, we need to control for expected performance.
The median number of correctly solved additions was 15 (ranging from 5 to 43), and
the median error rate was 0.19 (ranging from 0.03 to 0.69).10 Crucially, participants
were asked their expected relative performance (after completing the real-effort task) in
a seven-point scale. The expected relative performance did not differ across treatments
according to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test (control treatment, mean 4.089;
No Info treatment, 4.300; z = −1.055, p = 0.2913). We classified participants into three
groups according to their beliefs, i.e. below, exactly, and above average.11
Figure 2(a) disentangles the proportions of performance-based choices within the
three expectation groups. The performance-based split was chosen less often in the
10After completing the real-effort task but before making the distribution choice, participants were
asked about their expected performance, that is, how many additions they thought they had solved
correctly. The average expectation was 15.2 additions in the control treatment and 17.3 in the No Info
treatment. The difference was not significant according to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (z = −1.457,
p = 0.1452).
11For simplicity, the question on expected relative performance did not refer to a group. Since allo-















































































































Figure 2: Experiment 1, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits and Expected Perfor-
mance. (a) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment
and expected ranking. (b) Expected versus actual performance by gender
control treatment than in the No Info treatment across all three groups. For participants
who expected to be above average, the performance-based split was chosen 24 out of 36
times (66.67%) in the control treatment, compared to 39 out of 43 (90.70%) in the No
Info treatment (test of proportions, z = −2.647, p = 0.0081). For participants who
expected to perform exactly on average, the performance-based split was chosen 6 out
of 23 times (26.09%) in the control treatment, compared to 14 out of 21 (66.67%) in the
No Info treatment (z = −2.700, p = 0.0069). For participants who expected to be below
average, the performance-based split was also chosen less often in the control treatment
(16.13%; 5 of 31) than in the No Info treatment (38.46%; 10 of 26), but the difference
narrowly missed significance (z = −1.907, p = 0.0565). Additionally, comparing the
proportions of choices across groups, one sees that, as was to be expected, a higher
expected performance resulted in a higher proportion of performance-based choices (see
regression analysis below).12
We did not find any difference in beliefs across treatments. However, women believed
that they had performed worse (average 3.800 in the 7-point scale), compared to men’s
expectations (average 4.589 in the 7-point scale). The difference is highly significant
12A separate probit regression showed no significant interaction between treatment and expected per-
formance.
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Table 2: Experiment 1, Probit Regressions on Performance-based Choices
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3








Constant −0.282∗∗ 0.140 −0.224
(0.1340) (0.1875) (0.2126)
LogLikelihood −115.120 −109.701 −90.676
Wald Test 17.458∗∗∗ 26.590∗∗∗ 50.785∗∗∗
Linear combination tests:
No Info + No Info X Female 1.257∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗
(0.2854) (0.3102)
Female + No Info X Female −0.064 0.045
(0.278) (0.303)
Notes. Standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(MWW test, z = 3.924, p = 0.0001). Figure 2(b) plots the expected performance (aver-
age report in the 7-point Likert scale) for males and females, conditional on the actual
population septiles in the experiment, as computed from the number of correctly solved
additions. This figure makes apparent that females tend to underestimate their perfor-
mance compared to males, as previously pointed out, e.g., by Gneezy et al. (2003).13
3.4 Regression Analysis
Recapitulating, in the previous subsections we have seen that performance curiosity
shifts choices toward the performance-based split and away from the egalitarian alloca-
tion, and that this effect is far stronger for women. However, we have also seen that
choices are influenced by the expected ranking, and that there are differences in beliefs
across genders. In view of these results, our next step is to conduct regression analyses
controlling for expected ranking. This will also allow us to investigate the determinants
of the gender effect.
We hence turn to probit regressions on the choice of the performance-based split
accounting for treatment, gender, and expected ranking. We report on three different
model specifications in Table 2.
13Although the task has been determined to be gender-neutral (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), in
our sample women actually performed worse than men, with an average 18.4 correct additions for males
and 15.0 for females (MWW test, z = 3.349, p = 0.0008). Causality, of course, might go in the other
direction because of stereotype threat (recall Footnote 6).
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Model 1 investigates the basic treatment effect without further controls. The treat-
ment dummy is highly significant and positive, reproducing in the regression the basic
message of the test of proportions in Section 3.2, as illustrated in Figure 1(a). Model 2
adds gender and its interaction with the treatment dummy. The reference group is hence
made of males in the control treatment. The treatment dummy becomes non-significant,
reflecting that the treatment effect misses significance for males as found in Section 3.2
(recall Figure 1(b)). In contrast, the interaction of the treatment dummy and the female
dummy is significant, showing that women react to the manipulation more strongly than
men. A post-hoc linear combination test (No Info + No Info × Female, bottom of Table
2) reveals that the treatment effect for women is highly significant (p < 0.0001). The
female dummy is negative and highly significant, showing that women choose the egal-
itarian allocation more often than men in the control treatment. However, this gender
difference does not exist in the No Info treatment, as shown by the corresponding linear
combination test (Female + No Info × Female, bottom of Table 2; p = 0.8181).
Model 3 is the key regression, which introduces the expected ranking of participants
and sheds light into the determinants of the gender differences. First, the independent
variable “Expected Performance in Septiles”, centered at 0, is highly significant and posi-
tive, confirming that the higher the expectations the more likely it is that the participant
chooses the performance-based split, as higher expectations make the latter split more
attractive. Once we control for this natural effect, the treatment dummy becomes highly
significant and positive, indicating that performance curiosity is a significant driver of
behavior for males. The linear combination test confirms that the treatment effect is
also highly significant for females. That is, after controlling for the expectations we see
that both male and female participants are more likely to choose the performance-based
split when inequality aversion conflicts with performance curiosity.
In contrast, in Model 3 the female dummy and its interaction with the treatment
dummy are not significant anymore. A linear combination test also shows that there is
no gender difference in the No Info treatment (p = 0.8822). That is, the entire gender
effect observed in previous regressions and tests originates exclusively in differences in
expectations. In other words, since females have lower expectations, the performance-
based split is less attractive, and hence chosen less often by females than by males. Once
we control for expectations, we see that the effects of performance curiosity are present
for both genders.
4 Experiment 2
The purpose of our second experiment was threefold. First, the experiment was conceived
as a replication in order to establish the reliability of the effects. Accordingly, the
first two treatments of Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1. Second,
we added a third treatment to the design, the Only Winner Treatment, in order to
test whether revealing only partial information, namely whether one is the winner or
13
not, is enough to produce the same effect we found in Experiment 1. Human beings
have intrinsic preferences for winning, perceived as a reward in itself. That is, they
choose to exert effort to win (Fershtman et al., 2012) regardless of the payoff distribution
resulting from their eventual victory. Hence, one could speculate that the effects we
uncovered in Experiment 1 are actually derived from this motivation only, that is, that
the desire to know whether one is the winner is the actual driver behind the effect. In the
new treatment, the information regarding whether one is the winner or not is revealed
independently of the distribution choice. Hence, if the desire to know whether one is the
winner were enough to satisfy the need for information about performance, in the new
treatment the effect should disappear.
Third, we added additional controls (personality scales) to the design in order to test
for the robustness of the effects with respect to individual differences. The new controls
were of two kinds, related, first, to general curiosity, and, second, to self-motives. Specif-
ically, we focused on epistemic curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994; Litman et al., 2005), using
the epistemic curiosity questionnaire by Litman and Mussel (2013), and self-motives
(Sedikides and Strube, 1995, 1997), using the questionnaire by Gregg et al. (2011).
Both constructs are described in Section 2 and their analysis is relegated to Appendix
A.
4.1 Design and Procedures
The experiment was a between-subject design with three treatments, again conducted
at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research, and programmed in z-Tree. We
recruited 270 participants through ORSEE from the University of Cologne’s pool, ex-
cluding psychology students. The sample was perfectly balanced by gender, leaving 45
females and 45 males for each of the three treatments. The average payoff was EUR 10.56
(USD 14.21) for a session that lasted around 55 minutes.
The experiment differed from Experiment 1 in two respects. First, since after Ex-
periment 1 we concluded that neither risk attitudes nor achievement motivation were
determinant for the treatment effect, we replaced those questionnaires by the ones mea-
suring epistemic curiosity and self-motives as explained above. Since questionnaires were
placed at the end of the experiment, the change could not affect behavior and the ex-
periments remain fully comparable. Second, we added a third treatment, but the other
two treatments were identical to the control and No Info treatments of Experiment 1
(recall Table 1), hence the new experiment contains a pure replication.
The third treatment is the Only Winner Treatment. In this treatment, the egalitar-
ian and performance-based allocations are identical to those of other treatments, but the
associated information is different. If the performance-based split is chosen and imple-
mented, as in the other two treatments all information regarding how many additions
have been correctly solved by each member of the group and the resulting ranking is
revealed. The difference is that, if the equal split is the one chosen and implemented,
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Table 3: Only Winner Treatment in Experiment 2
Only Winner Treatment
Equal Split Performance-Based
Rank Share (%) Rank Share (%)
1 20 1 40
- 20 2 30
- 20 3 15
- 20 4 10
- 20 5 5
then the only information revealed is how many additions were correctly solved by the
winner, plus a signal indicating whether the participant is the winner or not. See Table
3 for a summary of the treatment.
The rest of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 regarding the real-effort task,
the procedure for implementing the chosen allocation, the order of tasks and decisions,
self-efficacy elicitation, and the final possibility to privately receive feedback.
4.2 Distribution Choices
Figure 3 shows the proportions of participants choosing the performance-based split
across the three treatments, for the whole sample (a) and split by gender (b). We
successfully replicated the main result of Experiment 1. There were significantly more
performance-based choices in the No Info treatment (75.56% of 90) than in the control
treatment (43.33% of 90) (test of proportions, z = −4.402, padj < 0.0001, adjusted for
multiple comparisons following the Holm-Bonferroni method). Further, the proportion of
performance-based choices in the OnlyWinner treatment (60.00% of 90) was significantly
smaller than in the No Info treatment (z = 2.233, padj = 0.0256), and larger than in the
control treatment (z = −2.237, padj = 0.0505), although the latter difference narrowly
misses significance. That is, the new treatment lies clearly “in the middle” between the
two previous ones.
Females chose the performance-based split less often than males in the control treat-
ment (females, 33.33%; males, 53.33%; z = 1.915, p = 0.0556), although the difference
narrowly misses significance, whereas there were no gender differences in the No Info
treatment (females, 71.11%; males, 80.00%; z = 0.981, p = 0.3265) or in the Only
Winner treatment (females, 53.33%; males, 66.67%; z = 1.291, p = 0.1967). That is,
the apparently higher degree of inequality aversion of women in the control treatment
disappears in both of the treatments with an informational tradeoff.
As in Experiment 1, when looking at females only, we also observe significantly
more performance-based choices in the No Info treatment (71.11%) than in the control
treatment (33.33%) (test of proportions, z = −3.588, padj = 0.0010). Further, the effect
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Figure 3: Experiment 2, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits. (a) Proportion of
participants choosing the performance-based split across treatments. (b) Proportion of
participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment and gender. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
z = −2.683, padj = 0.0219). That is, although the effect for males missed significance
in Experiment 1, it is significant in the replication, and we conclude that both men and
women chose the performance-based split significantly more often when information was
not revealed in the equal split. Looking at females only, the proportion of performance-
based choices in the Only Winner treatment (53.33%) again lies between the control and
the No Info treatments, although the effects miss significance (No Info vs. Only Winner,
z = 1.739, padj = 0.0820; control vs. Only Winner, z = −1.915, padj = 0.1111). The
proportion of performance-based choices for males in the OnlyWinner treatment (66.7%)
was also between those of the other treatments, but the effects are not significant (No
Info vs. Only Winner, z = 1.430, padj = 0.3053; control vs. Only Winner, z = −1.291,
padj = 0.1967).
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If partial information, namely whether one was or not the winner, was enough to
satisfy performance curiosity, the effect seen in Experiment 1 should disappear in the
Only Winner treatment, because the information regarding the winner was available in
both allocations. Quite to the contrary, we observe that the effect is already present
in the Only Winner treatment. Hence, we discard that revealing partial information
14The interaction between gender and treatments was not significant in an additional probit regression.
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about the winner is enough to satisfy performance curiosity. The general picture that
arises so far is that Experiment 2 successfully replicated the results of Experiment 1,
but additionally the new treatment, where the information tradeoff also exists but is less
severe than in the No Info treatment (because less information is hidden under the equal
split) is simply midway between the control treatment and the No Info one. That is, the
stronger the informational tradeoff, the stronger the influence of performance curiosity,
leading the participants to choose the fully informative performance-based split.
4.3 Expected Performance
The median number of correctly solved additions in Experiment 2 was 15 (ranging from 3
to 36), and the median error rate was 0.15 (ranging from 0 to 0.73).15 As in Experiment
1, we control for the individual beliefs regarding the expected ranking, elicited after
the completion of the real-effort task but before the distribution choice. Figure 4(a)
illustrates the expected own ranking of the participants. In contrast to Experiment
1, there were some minor but significant differences in expectations across treatments.
Specifically, the average expected septile for participants in the No Info treatment (4.378)
was significantly higher than that of the participants in the Only Winner treatment
(3.889; z = 2.487, padj = 0.0387), and also higher than that of the participants in the
control treatment (3.978; MWW test, z = 2.100, padj = 0.0714) although the difference
missed significance. There were no significant differences in expectations between the
control and Only Winner treatments (z = 0.430, padj = 0.6674).
As in Experiment 1, the proportion of performance-based choices was significantly
higher in the No Info treatment than in the control treatment, both for participants
who expected to perform above average (control, 73.53% of N = 34; No Info, 97.67%
of N = 43; test of proportions, z = −3.130, p = 0.0017) and for those who expected
to perform on average (control, 23.81% of N = 21; No Info, 72.00% of N = 25; z =
−3.256, p = 0.0011). The difference for participants who expected to perform below the
average was not significant (control, 25.71% of N = 35; No Info, 36.36% of N = 22;
z = −0.856, p = 0.3922). However, we do not observe “last-place aversion” (Kuziemko
et al., 2014) in the sense that for those subjects the equal split distribution is not chosen
significantly more often in the No Info treatment, where they could hide their expected
poor placement.
As commented above, the proportion of performance-based choices in the Only Win-
ner treatment lies between the proportion of performance-based split in the control and
No Info treatments. Of course, this points to weaker effect sizes when comparing with
15As in Experiment 1, participants were asked how many additions they thought they had solved
correctly (after completing the real-effort task but before making the distribution choice). The average
expectation was 16.2 additions in the control treatment, 17.3 additions in the No Info treatment, and 15.0
additions in the Only Winner treatment. The differences were generally not significant according Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon tests, adjusted for multiple testing (control vs. No Info, z = −1.177, padj = 0.2393;
















































































































Figure 4: Experiment 2, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits and Expected Perfor-
mance. (a) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment
and belief. (b) Expected versus actual performance by gender
either of the other two treatments. As a consequence, when splitting the data into the
three expected performance ranges, the differences are in general not significant.
Figure 4(b) plots the expected performance (average report in the 7-point Likert
scale) for males and females, conditional on the actual population septiles in the experi-
ment, as computed from the number of correctly solved additions (compare with Figure
2(b)). As in Experiment 1, we observe that females tend to underestimate performance
compared to males. This is confirmed by a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test on the whole
sample (males, N = 135, average expected septile 4.304; females, N = 135, average
3.859; z = 2.843, p = 0.0045).16
4.4 Regression Analysis
We now turn to a regression analysis to confirm the results of our non-parametric tests
while controlling for expected ranking and for the various other individual variables
measured in the experiment. In view of the results above, instead of treatment dummies
we introduce two dummies representing what kind of information is revealed. The first
dummy, Hidden Info, captures all cases when some information is hidden in the equal
16As in Experiment 1, women actually performed worse than men, with an average 17.2 correct
additions for males and 15.1 for females (MWW test, z = 2.294, p = 0.0218). Recall Footnote 13.
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Table 4: Experiment 2, Probit Regressions on Performance-based Choices
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Hidden Info 0.860∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗
(0.1961) (0.1978) (0.2208)






Constant −0.168 0.0220 −0.0634
(0.1328) (0.1547) (0.1694)
LogLikelihood −172.205 −169.224 −136.021
Wald Test 19.261∗∗∗ 24.540∗∗∗ 68.681∗∗∗
Linear Combination Test 0.421∗∗ 0.430∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
Hidden Info + Only First (0.1884) (0.1899) (0.2077)
Notes. Standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
split, that is, both the No Info and the Only Winner treatment. The second dummy,
Only First, further differentiates the cases where only information regarding the winner
is revealed when the equal split is implemented, that is, identifies the Only Winner
treatment. This way we can better analyze the differential effects of the informational
treatments and emphasize the comparisons between the Only Winner and the No Info
treatments (captured directly by the Only First dummy) and between the No Info and
the control treatments (captured by the Hidden Info dummy).
Model 1 (see Table 4) captures the basic treatment effects without additional con-
trols and reproduces the insights from the non-parametric tests as illustrated in Figure
3(a). The Hidden Information dummy is positive and highly significant, showing that
choosing the performance-based split was more likely in the No Info treatment than
in the control treatment. The Only First dummy is significant and negative, show-
ing that performance-based choices were less likely in the Only Winner treatment than
in the No Info treatment. A linear combination test (bottom of Table 4) shows that
performance-based choices were more likely in the Only Winner treatment than in the
control treatment.
In Model 2, we further control for gender. Females are less likely to choose the
performance-based split than men, as reflected by the significantly negative female
dummy. Adding interactions between gender and treatments does not change the re-
sults qualitatively. Otherwise, the results of Model 1 are not affected by controlling for
gender.
Model 3 incorporates the expected performance (in septiles and centered at 0), which,
as in Experiment 1, is shown to have a positive and highly significant effect on the like-
lihood of choosing the performance-based split. That is, subjects are naturally more
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likely to choose the performance-based split when they expect to be highly ranked. As
expected, the female dummy becomes insignificant controlling for expectations, confirm-
ing that the apparent gender effect is fully driven by the fact that females have lower
expectations than males. The key treatment effect remains significant, showing that
even when controlling for expectations the performance-based choice is more likely in
the No Info treatment than in the control treatment (as in Experiment 1). However, the
difference between the No Info and the Only Winner treatments becomes insignificant
(p = 0.1686) when we control for expectations. Accordingly, the difference between the
control and the Only Winner treatments becomes more pronounced and highly signif-
icant (p = 0.0061), suggesting that, after controlling for expectations, both the Only
Winner and the No Info treatments actually have similar effects. Recall that if partial
information were already enough to satisfy performance curiosity, we would expect no
effect at all in the Only Winner treatment, as this information is available independently
of the distribution choice. Hence, it seems that the driver of behavior is the actual cu-
riosity to know the own performance, independently of whether one is the winner or
not.
5 Discussion
We have shown that performance curiosity, a form of intrinsic motivation related to self-
image, can overcome preferences for egalitarian allocations of jointly generated proceeds.
In our experiments, a subtle manipulation in the structure of information regarding how
well each participant performed in a real-effort task was enough to produce large shifts
away from equal-split choices and toward performance-based schemes. This effect sub-
sists even when one controls for expected relative performance, which of course correlates
with the choice of the performance-based allocation, as the latter maximizes expected
income if one expects to perform better than average.
As we expected, the effect of performance curiosity appears to be much stronger
for females than for males, with the consequence that the manipulation greatly helps
reduce gender differences in egalitarian choices. The gender difference in our results
is fully explained by differences in performance beliefs. Apparent gender differences
regarding the proportion of equal-split choices (and hence, inequality aversion) are caused
by differences in beliefs regarding the own performance, namely the fact that, compared
to women, men are typically more overconfident. The difference in beliefs creates an
apparent gender effect in the control treatment, with females choosing the egalitarian
allocation more often than males. This difference (and the effect of beliefs) disappears
in the presence of performance curiosity. Our analysis hence identifies a factor which
helps overcome gender differences arising from relative underconfidence.
Appendix A analyzes and discards a number of alternative explanations for our
results, on the basis of supplementary data (questionnaires) collected in the two exper-
iments. Some other alternative interpretations of our results and possible extensions
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are as follows. First, it is well-known that different factors as entitlement, merits, etc,
can be used as justifications in order to depart from “fair” allocations and switch to
more favorable ones (in terms of income). It could be argued that the presence of ad-
ditional information attached to the performance-based split could have been used as
precisely such a justification even if the participants did not care about the information
itself. However, this explanation is unlikely because our data shows a larger proportion
of performance-based distribution choices in the No Info treatment than in the con-
trol treatment even for subjects who expected to perform exactly on or below average.
For those participants, by design the income-maximizing decision would have been the
equal split. Hence, the additional information has no value as an excuse to pursue an
income-maximizing allocation.
Second, a possible alternative interpretation would be that the effect is simply due to
the fact that, in the No info treatment, the performance-based distribution comes with
an additional informational attribute than the equal split distribution. This explanation
would imply that general curiosity is far stronger than assumed, in the sense that the
particular content of the additional information is not relevant. By its very nature, a
performance-based split will always reveal some information on performance, hence it is
not possible to shut down that informational attribute and replace it with an alternative,
less informative one. However, the explanation could be tested with an additional design
where the equal split is endowed with some non-informative attribute (with respect to
performance; e.g., the weather forecast of a remote country) but the performance-based
split is still endowed with performance information. Hence, the number of informational
attributes would be kept constant, and any difference would be due to the actual nature
of the information. This design goes beyond the scope of the present work.
A related point is that in the No Info treatment it was made salient that information
on performance was being left out, which might have increased the focus on performance.
This is unavoidable, since the point of our design is to make the tradeoff between in-
formation and an equal-split allocation apparent. However, the real-effort task was run
before the actual choices were presented. There was no information whatsoever about
the fact that performance information might or might not be revealed depending on later
choices (in the No Info treatment, the initial instructions mentioned that choices might
differ in attached information, but the nature of such information was not explained un-
til after the real-effort task). That is, the fact that there was a tradeoff with respect to
information on performance was only apparent right before the actual choice of distribu-
tion, and hence any possible salience effects would have been kept to a minimum. Also,
we remark that, as shown in the regression analysis, the effect subsists when controlling
for expected performance.
Some extensions of the present research would be natural. We mention here just two
of them. First, Loewenstein (1994) argued that curiosity may be an impulsive hedonic
drive that easily wanes after being satisfied. If this is the case, prosocial decision makers
might regret having chosen feedback over equality, leading to different decisions in the
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future. Since our objective was to show that performance curiosity can trump inequality
aversion, we adopted a purely one-shot design, and hence we cannot test this additional
possibility. It would be possible to expand the design incorporating repeated decisions
in order to test for this hypothesis, but if performance was revealed between decisions,
it would be necessary to appropriately control for it.
A second natural avenue for further research would be to elicit the actual willingness
to pay for information on performance. In view of well-known behavioral phenomena
pointing at discrepancies between valuations and actual choices and the noisy character
of evaluations (e.g., Delquié, 1993; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016), we aimed to establish that
the postulated effect had consequences on actual behavior (choice data), but once this
effect has been established, evaluating the willingness to pay for information is a natural
second step. Although we leave this task for future research, we can offer some pre-
liminary evidence because, as mentioned above, participants who believed to be exactly
on average or below would have maximized expected payoffs by choosing the equal-split
allocation, but did not choose that allocation more often. Hence they actually revealed
the willingness to incur monetary costs in order to obtain the information.
We view our research as a contribution to the general investigation into the causes
of and motivations behind preferences among different distributional allocations, espe-
cially in frameworks where the resources that are distributed can be traced back to
individual contributions. This is potentially important for reward schemes in firms and
organizations, and for a deeper understanding of attitudes with respect to fairness and
redistribution at the societal level. Our results, however, can be read in two different
ways. If egalitarian allocations are viewed as fair and hence as a worthy policy objective,
the results point out that support for egalitarian principles might be diminished in soci-
ety if information on individual performance is restricted, for instance in order to protect
privacy or to avoid making interpersonal comparisons prominent. While people might be
willing to accept egalitarian redistributions independently of whether they profit from
them themselves or not, they still have a strong preference for receiving information
on their relative individual contribution. On the other hand, if rewarding performance
through incentives is viewed as fair and desirable, linking information to rewards might
result in increased social support of the corresponding distribution schemes.
Appendix A: Robustness Analysis
A.1 Experiment 1
In this subsection, we report on a few additional controls which help discard possible
alternative interpretations. First, it is natural to speculate that some participants might
choose the egalitarian distribution in the No Info treatment in order to protect their
self-image, especially if they fear being below average, because in this way they avoid
being exposed to negative feedback. However, this would create a tendency leading to
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less performance-based splits, which we do not observe, even among participants who
expected to be below average. In any case, we anticipated this alternative explanation
and we introduced a final question for participants in the No Info treatment, after all
other decisions have been made but before the distribution was implemented. In this
question, we asked them whether they wanted to be privately informed about their own
performance (both absolute and relative, that is, number of correctly solved additions
and ranking within the group), independently of which distribution was finally imple-
mented. Recall that even if a participant chose the performance-based split, it was not
guaranteed that the information would be revealed, since the random mechanism could
select a different participant, which might have chosen the egalitarian allocation instead.
Hence the additional question made sense to participants. All participants but one (that
is, 89 out of 90) chose to see their own performance, indicating that the possible desire
to protect their self-image against feedback was not a factor.
Second, we measured risk attitudes by means of the lottery questionnaire of Holt
and Laury (2002). There were no differences in risk attitudes by gender (males: mean
relative risk aversion parameter 0.497; females: mean 0.558; MWW test, z = −0.405,
p = 0.6851), treatment (control treatment: mean 0.526; No Info treatment: mean 0.530;
z = −0.203, p = 0.8388), or choice (egalitarian choice, N = 82, mean 0.530; performance-
based choice, N = 98, mean 0.526; z = −0.062, p = 0.9508).17
Third, we also used the reduced Achievement Motive Scale of Lang and Fries (2006) to
elicit achievement motives. That scale is divided in questions eliciting two components,
aptly named “hope of success” and “fear of failure.” Each subscale is made out of 5
items on a 4-point Likert scale, and the (added) scores of the subscale range from 4 to
20. We found the gender differences typically described in the literature, namely that
men score significantly higher on the hope of success scale (males: mean 17.122; females:
mean 15.944; MWW test, z = 3.518, p = 0.0004) and women score significantly higher
on the fear of failure scale (males: mean 10.344; females: mean 12.400; z = −4.346,
p < 0.0001). There were no differences across treatments, neither for hope of success
(control treatment, mean 16.300; No Info treatment, mean 16.767; z = −1.379, p =
0.1680) nor for fear of failure (control treatment, mean 11.400; No Info treatment, mean
11.344; z = 0.200, p = 0.8417).
There was no difference by choices in the scores of the fear of failure scale (egali-
tarian choice: N = 82, mean 11.780; performance-based choice, N = 98, mean 11.031;
z = 1.470, p = 0.1415). However, participants who chose the performance-based split
scored higher on the hope of success scale (egalitarian choice: N = 82, mean 15.841;
performance-based choice, N = 98, mean 17.112; z = −3.689, p = 0.0002). This differ-
ence is also significant if we look separately at the control treatment (egalitarian choice:
N = 55, mean 15.872; performance-based choice, N = 35, mean 16.971; z = −2.914,
p = 0.0283) and the No Info treatment (egalitarian choice, N = 27, mean 15.778;
17Pooling together a large number of experimental studies, Filippin and Crosetto (2016) find significant
but very small gender differences in risk attitudes, as measured by the lottery-questionnaire method.
23
performance-based choice, N = 63, mean 17.190, z = −2.776, p = 0.0055). This makes
sense as hope of success should be associated with higher expectations, hence a higher
likelihood of choosing the performance-based split. In other words, we do not gain any
new insights from the achievement motivation scales.
To further examine the effects of achievement motivation and risk attitudes, and
also to study the robustness of the basic effects, we added them as controls in a further
regression model (see Table A.1). This model also includes interactions with the No
Info treatment, which should reflect any possible explanation of the basic effect based
on the individual differences captured by the new measures. This has the problem that
the interpretation of the treatment dummy becomes more complex. To test for the
treatment effect of the manipulation, we calculated the average marginal effects of the
treatment dummy on the performance-based split choice.18 As shown in the bottom line
of Table A.1, the average marginal effects of the treatment dummy are highly significant
and quantify a 25% increase in the probability of choosing the performance-based split
after including the manipulation in the structure of the information.
The regression model, however, did not detect any significant effects of risk attitudes,
hope of success, or fear of failure. Hence, we conclude that these additional variables do
not hid any alternative explanation and our basic effects, as captured in Model 3 (Table
2), are robust.
A.2 Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, subjects in the No Info and Only Winner treatments were asked
whether they wanted to be informed about the own absolute and relative performance
after making the distribution choice. Only two subjects (of 180) declined to receive
feedback. Hence, we conclude again that self-image protection does not appear to be a
factor in our experiments.
In Experiment 2, we further investigated the possible relation of performance cu-
riosity to existing constructs capturing curiosity. We focused on epistemic curiosity
(Loewenstein, 1994; Litman et al., 2005; recall Section 2) and included the epistemic
curiosity questionnaire by Litman and Mussel (2013). Further, since our explanation for
the relevance of performance curiosity hinges on the value of feedback for the own self-
image, we explored whether this link was captured by differences in standard self-motives
(Sedikides and Strube, 1995, 1997; recall Section 2) and included the questionnaire by
Gregg et al. (2011).
Model 4 (see Table A.2) includes the two measures for epistemic curiosity (EC) and
the four measures of self-motives (SM) elicited through questionnaires, and the interac-
tion of each of the six measures with the two information dummies. None of the new
measures is significant, and among the twelve interactions only one reaches significance,
18The average marginal effect calculates the average difference in the predicted probability of choosing
the performance-based split if all observations would have been in the No Info treatment, compared to
if all observations would have been in the control treatment.
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Table A.1: Experiment 1, Additional Probit Regression on Performance-based Choices
Interactions with
Model 4 No Info Treatment








Risk Attitude 0.019 −0.054
(0.3769) (0.5074)
Hope of Success 0.047 0.002
(0.0666) (0.0865)






Average Marginal Effects 0.247∗∗∗
No Info Treatment (0.0517)
Notes. Standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
namely the interaction between self-improvement and the Hidden Information dummy.
There is hence, no convincing basis to speculate that the performance curiosity concept
might be captured or closely related to existing measures of curiosity or self-motives.
As in Model 3 (Table 4), there is no significant difference between the Only Winner
and the No Info treatments. Hence, Model 4 shows the robustness of Model 3. To
examine the robustness of the main results to the introduction of the new 18 coefficients,
we again calculated the average marginal effects to test for the treatment effect. Those
are shown at the bottom of Table A.2. The effect of the No Info treatment is positive
and highly significant, showing that the probability of choosing the performance-based
split is increased by approximately 24% by the basic manipulation. This almost exactly
replicates the conclusion from Experiment 1 (recall Table A.1)
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Table A.2: Experiment 2, Additional Probit Regression: Epistemic Curiosity (EC) and
Self-Motives (SM)
Interactions with Interactions with









EC-Interest −0.012 0.034 −0.020
(0.0683) (0.0970) (0.1038)
EC-Deprived −0.010 −0.008 0.051
(0.0460) (0.0856) (0.0941)
SM-Enhance −0.012 0.027 0.005
(0.1388) (0.2061) (0.2038)
SM-Assessment −0.074 −0.016 −0.110
(0.1962) (0.2896) (0.2708)
SM-Verification −0.029 0.171 −0.255
(0.1397) (0.2301) (0.2394)











Notes. Standard errors in brackets,∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Appendix B: Translated Instructions
(Original instructions were in German)
General Instructions
The experiment consists of two parts in which you and four other participants
solve addition problems and make a decision. After the completion of these two parts,
a questionnaire will follow. In this experiment you will earn points which will be ex-
changed into Euros at end of the experiment. The exchange rate is:
1 point= 5 Eurocents.
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Independently of your decision, you will additionally receive 2.50 EUR for your partic-
ipation. The total amount will be paid in cash and anonymously at the end of the
experiment. On the following pages you will receive all further information which you
need for the experiment.
Instructions of the Experiment
General Sequence: For the duration of the whole experiment you belong to a group
consisting of 5 players (including you). This group will not change during the ex-
periment. The experiment consists of two different parts. In the first part you will
solve a series of addition problems. In the second part you will make a decision.
Addition Problems: In the first part you will make a series of addition problems.
Each addition problem consists of 5 two-digit numbers. Your task is to add up
these numbers, enter the sum into the appropriate field, and click “OK.” You can use
scratch paper to take notes. You have 8 minutes in total to solve addition problems.
Independently of the correctness of your input a new addition problem will be presented
each time you click “OK.” For each correctly solved addition problem you will earn 10
points for the whole group. Incorrectly solved addition problem do not earn any points
for the group.
After this part, a ranking within your group will be established. Your rank will be
determined by the number of correctly solved addition problems. Rank 1 has solved
the most and rank 5 has solved the least amount of addition problems. In case several
players correctly solved the same amount of addition problems a random device decides
which player is placed before the other one.
Your Decision:[Control Treatment ]
The second part is about the distribution of the joint points of your group. You
choose between two alternatives. The two options differ in how the earned points are
allocated among the group members.
Your Decision:[No Info Treatment, Only Winner Treatment ]
The second part is about the distribution of the joint points of your group. You
choose between two alternatives. The two options differ how the earned points are
allocated among the group members and what information is revealed to all players.
You choose one option by clicking the button below the distribution. Every player
in your group (including you) will choose among the two options. After all players
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